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Economic Assessment of the Euro Area: 
Winter 2020/2021 
This EUROFRAME Report presents an assess-
ment of the economic outlook for 2021 focuses 
on the euro area based on a synopsis of the fore-
casts of EUROFRAME institutes. Perspectives 
for UK and CEEs countries are described in 
Boxes A and B, respectively. 
In the Focus section, we discuss a special topic, 
based on work done in the EUROFRAME insti-
tutes. This time, we discuss the impact that the 
COVID-19 crisis had on labour markets in Eu-
rope and policy responses to this challenge, 
based on the experience in the countries hosting 
EUROFRAME institutes.  
The international outlook: the second wave of Covid-19 slows down 
the recovery 
The coronavirus outbreak triggered a world-
wide economic crisis without modern paral-
lel. When the first wave of the pandemic hit 
countries at the beginning of 2020, governments 
closed all non-essential businesses and issued 
stay-at-home orders. The resulting economic 
losses were huge in terms of output, jobs and 
incomes. Global trade of goods fell dramati-
cally. Services have been hit particularly hard, 
especially activities that rely on social interac-
tion such as tourism, hotels, restaurants and en-
tertainment.  
As summer approached, the number of Covid-
19 infections gradually decreased and most re-
strictions were lifted. Consumer expectations 
improved and activity had a “V shape” rebound, 
1 Air traffic and international tourism remain on the downside. In 
November 2020, the number of passengers on international 
flights was 88 per cent lower than a year earlier. 
with some countries experiencing a steeper than 
expected recovery. However, only China re-
gained its pre-crisis level of GDP. According to 
the CPB world trade monitor, global trade grew 
MoM since June and surpassed its pre-crisis 
level in November. According to recent data the 
current containment measures until now seem 
to have had little impact on the world trade in 
goods. However, the Covid-19 pandemic con-
tinues to weigh heavily on international trade in 
services.1  
The epidemiological situation started to worsen 
again in autumn 2020, forcing governments to 
implement a new round of lockdowns.  Alt-
hough most of these shutdowns are less strin-
gent than those enforced in spring (Chart 1), 
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these containment measures will reverse the 
summer’s recovery in many countries and are 
likely to negatively affect growth prospects for 
2021.   
Monetary and fiscal policy remain crucial to 
support activity and incomes. Monetary eas-
ing by several central banks contributed to pre-
serving favourable financing conditions 
throughout the pandemic period and will con-
tinue to do so going forward. The Fed at the end 
of August 2020 announced a shift in their  
Chart 1 -   Stringency index 
100 = strictest level of policies 
 
Source: Hale et al. (2020). 
Note: Data updated to January 2021. 
 
strategic objective toward a 2 per cent target on 
an average undetermined period and to short-
falls in full employment (rather than deviations 
from full employment), which would imply in-
flation to temporarily exceed 2 per cent in the 
coming years and could further delay the next 
interest rate hike. The ECB at the beginning of 
the crisis introduced additional policy tools 
(PELTROs, PEPP and more favourable condi-
tions for TLTROs), which in December 2020 it 
reinforced and extended beyond 2021 and 
pledged to adjust according to the evolution of 
the health crisis. 
China is leading the global recovery. The Chi-
nese economy recovered well from the first 
wave of the pandemic. The continued growth of 
industrial production and an economic structure 
which is more manufacturing orientated con-
tributed to this result (Chart 2). Moreover, it 
did not experience a second wave of infections 
so far, unlike other major economies. Asian 
economies are benefitting the most from 
China’s growth and the pre-Covid trend to-
wards trade regionalization in Asia is moving 
forward. The approval of the Regional Compre-
hensive Economic Partnership increases 
China’s influence in the region, especially after 
the US withdrew from the Trans-Pacific Part-
nership in 2017. This moves the global centre of 
trade more toward Asia. 
 
The start of a new era for US domestic and 
foreign policy. The worsening of the health cri-
sis in the last part of 2020 will slow the recovery 
after the rebound of Q3-2020. While GDP in the 
fourth quarter continued to grow (by 1 per cent 
QoQ), economic activity clearly lost momen-
tum. In December, the US labour market lost 
jobs for the first time after eight months, with 
leisure and hospitality the most seriously af-
fected. In January 2021, despite a monthly gain 
of 49 thousand jobs, total employment was still 


















Chart 2 – Industrial production 
December 2019 = 100 
 
Source:  Prometeia's calculations on National Statisti-
cal Offices data. 















crisis. After four years of the Trump administra-
tion, the results of the 2020 elections represent 
a turning point for the country’s domestic and 
foreign policy. President Biden will have room 
to advance his presidential domestic agenda, in-
cluding an additional Covid-19 relief package 
(already presented) to support low-income 
households and further budget stimuli. A return 
of the US on the global stage is also to be ex-
pected. Biden’s foreign policy plans include re-
suming US transatlantic relations and re-joining 
the Paris Agreement on climate change. 
Moderate global growth in 2021 due to a bad 
start to the year. Recent shutdowns will weigh 
on growth in the first part of 2021. Nevertheless, 
public health conditions should gradually im-
prove as the vaccination campaign progresses. 
The improvement of households and firms’ 
confidence will positively affect both private 
consumption and investments and will 
contribute to strengthen the recovery in the sec-
ond part of 2021. 
Risks to the projections are mainly downward 
and linked to the development of the health cri-
sis. An additional worsening of the pandemic, 
or delays in the availability and administration 
of the Covid-19 vaccines, could hamper house-
hold and corporate income growth. Moreover, 
China recently detected new coronavirus out-
breaks and imposed regional level shutdowns to 
contain the spread of infections ahead of the Lu-
nar New Year celebrations. If these containment 
measures slow down Chinese growth, the global 
economic outlook will be negatively affected 
too. 
An upside risk is associated with the successful 
implementation of a strong stimulus by the 
Biden administration to promote the US recov-
ery, with possible positive effects also for the 
global economy.  
The Euro Area Outlook: strong but incomplete recovery in the third 
quarter, doubts about the short term.  
 
The pandemic led to a historic contraction of 
economic activity in spring followed by a 
substantial but incomplete recovery in sum-
mer. Due to fewer restrictions, less risk of con-
tamination and the reopening of factories and 
shops, the recovery in production in the euro-
zone in the third quarter of 2020 was substantial 
but incomplete. In the second quarter, the QoQ 
decline of GDP was the largest ever recorded, 
but after that, the increase in the third quarter 
was also the largest ever. This recovery has 
compensated at least for two-thirds of the previ-
ous production decline. Nevertheless, the re-
maining decline is still significant: in the third 
quarter, GDP in the euro area was still 4.4 per 
cent lower than at the end of 2019. Only the 
GDP decline at the start of the great recession 
was greater (-5.3 per cent).  
With renewed containment measures in 
place during the fourth quarter and in the 
beginning of 2021, the short-term outlook for 
GDP has become less favourable. Resurging 
infection rates triggered renewed measures to 
contain the pandemic in autumn which derailed 
the recovery. Euro area GDP contracted by 0.7 
per cent in the fourth quarter, according to the 
Eurostat flash estimate, with declines in output 
concentrated in France, Italy and Austria.  PMI 
data indicate that the manufacturing sector still 
shows a sustained growth, whereas the service 
sector is increasingly constrained by severe so-
cial distancing measures (Chart 3). The manu-
facturing data from PMI are corroborated by the 
industrial production data from Eurostat. The 
renewed measures will also have a negative im-
pact on economic activity in the first quarter of 
2021. A sustained recovery will only start after 
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large scale vaccination amongst the general 
public reduces contaminations. Due to an antic-
ipated relaxation of the containment measures, 
production and consumption are expected to 
pick up from the second quarter onwards. Ini-
tially, the recovery is quite strong because of 
pent-up demand, with GDP growing at 4.9 per 
cent in 2021 (average of the EUROFRAME in-
stitutes forecasts). In 2022, the recovery will 
continue, albeit at a more moderate growth rate 
of 3.1 per cent. 
Chart 3 – PMI eurozone 
 
Source: Refinitiv, IHS Markit 
 
The Covid-19 crisis led to a sharp fall in 
hours worked, but comparatively modest 
rise in unemployment. In Europe, while the 
sharp fall in production has led to a decline in 
labour productivity, it has mainly resulted in a 
decrease in the number of hours worked.2 In the 
EU, the number of hours worked per person em-
ployed fell by 11 per cent in the second quarter 
compared to the previous quarter. The sharp de-
cline in the second quarter was followed by an 
increase of more than 15 per cent in the third 
quarter. Wage cost subsidies enabled this reduc-
tion in the number of hours worked per person 
                                                          
2 In the US, the production decline and subsequent recovery in 
production was reflected in the unemployment rate, which rose 
from a record low of 3.5 per cent in February to 14.7 per cent in 
April, before declining to 6.9 per cent in October. 
3 The advantage of the US approach is that there are more finan-
cial incentives for shifts from contracting to growth sectors. Inci-
dentally, in the US it is possible to be unemployed and still 
maintain a relationship with the last employer through a furlough 
scheme. See Eichhorst, W., P. Marx and U. Rinne, COVID-19 
employed and prevented a sharp rise in unem-
ployment in Europe (see Focus section). The 
advantage of the European approach is that the 
link between employee and company is main-
tained and production can be resumed more eas-
ily.3 In 2020, unemployment in the euro area 
showed a modest increase to 8.0 per cent. In 
2021, the average unemployment rate is ex-
pected to increase further before declining in 
2022. 
Governments have turned to massive sup-
port measures that have dampened the pro-
duction decline caused by the corona out-
break. Together with the decline in GDP, this 
has led to rather large budget deficits. For the 
euro area, the budget deficit has widened from 
0.6 per cent of GDP in 2019 to an expected 8.8 
per cent of GDP in 2020. This will increase gov-
ernment debt in the euro area to more than 100 
per cent of GDP. The European recovery pro-
gram of 750 billion euros will have no effect on 
the economy or budgets in 2020. A limited ef-
fect is expected for 2021. In 2020, the European 
Commission itself issued bonds for SURE, the 
100 billion euro programme mainly intended 
for wage cost subsidies. 
Inflation has weakened further in the euro 
area. Prices even fell from August 2020 for the 
first time since May 2016. This weakening was 
due to both the fall in oil prices and lower core 
inflation. The average headline inflation in 2020 
was 0.3 per cent. Temporary factors such as the 
VAT cut in Germany played a role in core infla-
tion. For 2021, the decline of the negative base 
effects will lead to an increase in inflation, but 
inflation is expected to remain well below the 
ECB target.4  
Crisis Response Monitoring; The Second Phase of the Crisis. 
IZA Research Report No. 105. IZA Institute of Labour Econom-
ics. 2021. 
4 Market expectations, based on inflation linked swaps, all show 
increases to pre-Covid levels after the large initial drop in Febru-































































Share prices were initially hit but partly re-
covered during 2020, while capital market 
interest rates were lower at the end of the 
year, at least in the euro area. Initially, stock 
prices fell sharply due to the corona outbreak, 
but after the rapid policy responses and initial 
signs of a recovery in global production, prices 
picked up again from the end of March (Chart 
4). At the end of 2020, US stock price indices 
were higher than at the end of 2019 and some 
significantly so (S&P 500: + 12 per cent, 
Nasdaq: +44 per cent). However, prices of Eu-
ropean shares remained lower than at the end of 
2019. (MSCI EURO: -4 per cent, MSCI EU-
ROPE FINANCIALS: -16 per cent). The fall 
from the end of 2019 to the end of 2020 in the 
10-year interest rate was 0.5 percentage points 
for the euro area as a whole.5  
 
Table 1 - Euro Area Forecasts - EUROFRAME Institutes average 
GDP CPI Inflation* Unemployment Rate** 
2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 
-7.4 4.9 3.1 0.2 1.2 1.4 8.0 8.8 8.2 
* HICP                 
** Eurostat definition               
 
Table 2 - Euro Area Forecasts 





  2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022   
Wifo -7.5 4.8 3.1 - - - - - - 18/12/2020 
ETLA -7.6 5.5 3 0.2 1.5 1.6 8 8.5 8 11/01/2021 
OFCE -7.2 5.7 - - - - - - - 10/2020 
DIW -7.5 4.8 2.9 0.0 0.8 1.3 8.2 9.8 9.5 10/12/2020 
IfW -7.2 4.9 4.0 0.3 1.7 1.4 8.1 8.4 7.4 16/12/2020 
Prometeia -7.2 4.3 2.6 0.2 1.1 1.2 8.0 8.5 8.1 08/02/2021 
CPB -8.2 5.5 3.2 0.4 0.9 1.4 - - - 11/2020 
NIESR -7.0 3.5 2.8 0.2 0.9 1.2 8.0 8.7 8.0 08/02/2021 
* HICP                     
** Eurostat definition                   
                                                          
5 In the US, further easing of monetary policy and a bleaker eco-
nomic outlook initially led to a decline in capital market interest 
rates of about 1 percentage point, but since August rates in-
creased again to more than 1 per cent. 





































































BOX A: CEEC Prospects 
Economies of Central and Eastern European Countries (CEEC) suffered from the unprecedented Covid-
19 epidemic in 2020. Recent projections show that the Czech Republic and Slovakia experienced the 
most substantial negative impact of Covid-19 in the region (6.8 per cent decline of GDP in 2020), 
whereas the economies of Poland and Lithuania are forecasted to decline at a relatively low pace (1.9 
per cent and 3.5 per cent decline, respectively). The GDP decline in 2020 in Bulgaria, Estonia, Romania, 
and Latvia is expected to range from 4.5 up to 5.5 per cent. Unsurprisingly, private consumption and 
private investment in the second quarter of 2020 were the main drivers of the observed GDP decline. In 
Poland, the largest economy in the region, private consumption and investment fell in the second quarter 
by 10.5 and 9.0 per cent QoQ, respectively. The downfall in private consumption is expected to remain 
between -3.0 and -4.0 per cent in the vast majority of CEECs, whereas private investment was much 
more volatile across countries with the expected mean decline of over 8 per cent. A sharp decline in the 
economic activity could also be observed on the labour markets as the increase in unemployment rates 
ranged from 2.7 up to 3.5 percentage points over 2020.  
The governments of CEECs responded to the Covid-19 pandemic through various fiscal measures. 
These measures are expected to increase government expenditure on average by 4.8 and 1.3 per cent 
YoY in 2020 and 2021, respectively. Along with decreased tax revenues, elevated expenditure will lead 
to a deterioration in the state of the public finances. The average budget balance-to-GDP ratio in the 
region is projected to reach -7.4 per cent in 2020 and -5.2 per cent in 2021. Overall, the general govern-
ment debt-to-GDP ratio is expected to hit 46.1 per cent in 2020 and 48.2 per cent in 2021, in total in the 
region. 
Due to the expected roll-out of the vaccine for the Covid-19 virus and the assumed easing of containment 
measures, CEEC economies are expected to rebound in 2021. However, GDP in real terms in all CEECs 
in 2021 will remain below the levels observed in 2019. A full recovery of CEE economies is expected 
no earlier than in 2022. GDP growth in 2021 is projected to reach up to 5.4 per cent year-over-year in 
Slovakia and as low as 3.1 per cent in Lithuania. Poland, Hungary, and Latvia are the other countries 
are expected to grow at the pace of over 4 per cent. The annual GDP growth for Poland is forecasted at 
4.1 per cent and 4.0 per cent in 2021 and 2022, respectively. Hence, the Polish economy is expected to 
return to its pre-Covid growth trends. 
The rebound will mostly be driven by the aggregates that suffered most throughout 2020, namely private 
consumption that is expected to increase at the highest pace in Latvia and Poland (5.7 and 4.5 per cent 
year-over-year growth in 2021, respectively). Private investment is projected to be the second most 
important engine of growth with year-over-year growth exceeding the increase in consumption expendi-
ture. The fastest increase in private investment is forecasted for Slovakia (10.9 per cent growth in 2021) 
and Estonia (7.9 per cent growth). Government consumption in CEE as a whole is forecasted to grow at 







BOX B: UK prospects 
The UK economy is forecast to grow by a moderate 3.4 per cent in 2021, after having contracted by 9.9 
per cent in 2020. The majority of the fall in 2020 came in Q2, when activity fell by 18.8 per cent QoQ 
under lockdown restrictions. A fairly robust recovery in June and July slowed over the autumn, with 
activity returning to 94 per cent of February levels in October. November saw a second and less 
restrictive lockdown in England, output falling 2.6 per cent MoM. In January the resurgence of the virus 
forced a third lockdown which is likely to last through much of first quarter and is set to reduce activity 
to a level above that of April 2020 but below that of November. 
The hospitality sector has borne the brunt of public health measures, operating at below 10 per cent of 
pre-Covid levels in April. Retail was initially badly affected but rebounded strongly through the 
reopening of shops (since reversed), switching to online retail, and substituting purchases for social 
consumption – food and drink in particular. 
The other major economic risk faced by the UK economy in 2020 was the risk of a ‘no deal’ Brexit: 
something which was averted by the signing of a Trade and Cooperation Agreement with the EU in 
December, shortly before the transition period came to an end. This avoids the worst case scenario but 
is still likely to see the capacity of the UK economy smaller, though much of this gradual contraction 
will have taken place already since the referendum in 2016.  
Business investment, long disappointing, may rise in 2021 as uncertainty from Covid and Brexit 
dissipates, but history cautions against forecasting any sort of boom in this category. 
The UK is running one of the most succesful vaccine roll-out programmes in the world, but there is still 
a lot of uncertainty around as to how soon can Covid-19 restrictions be permanently lifted. 
Unemployment is likely to rise to 7-8 per cent after labour market support policies are withdrawn: 
currently expected to be in April. 
Inflation has remained low in recent months and was at 0.6 per cent in December. A consumer recovery 
combined with increased supply costs as a result of Brexit and Covid-related corporate debt are likely 
to lead to a rise in inflation over the course of 2021, though probably not rising above its 2 per cent 
target. 
Monetary and fiscal policy measures have been taken to support the economy. The Bank of England cut 
its interest rate from 0.75 per cent to 0.1 per cent and increased the size of its quantitative easing (QE) 
programme by ₤450 billion to ₤895 billion, almost doubling the size of its balance sheet and contributing 
to lowering rates on government bonds. Given the limited scope for reducing interest rates and the nature 
of the crisis, fiscal policy has played a larger role both in terms of the scale of the support and in the 
types of support given, pushing the public sector debt to GDP ratio above 100 per cent for the first time 
since 1961-62. With debt expected to reach 110 per cent of GDP in fiscal year 2021-22, there is pressure 
on the Chancelor of the Exchequer to announce a plan to reduce debt in the medium term while still 
supporting the economy in the short term. The Government’s next Budget is set for 3 March when more 














a (HICP, %)b (Eurostat defini-
tion, %) 
forecast 
  2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022 2020 2021 2022   
Austria (WIFO)** -7.3 4.5 3.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 5.4 5.1 4.8 18/12/2020 
Finland (ETLA) -3.5 3 1.9 0.5 1.3 1.2 8.1 7.9 7.6 11/01/2021 
France (OFCE) -9.5 7.1 n.a. 0.5 0.5 - 8.4 10.1 - 12/2020 
Germany (DIW) -5.4 5.3 2.7 0.5 1.6 1.6 4.4 4.3 3.9 10/12/2020 
Germany (IfW) -5.2 3.1 4.5 0.5 2.6 1.7 4.2 4.8 4.1 16/12/2020 
Italy (Prometeia) -8.9 4.8 4.1 -0.1 0.7 1.0 9.1 11.0 10.7 08/02/2021 
Ireland (ESRI) 3.4 4.9 - - - - 18.4 14.5 - 17/12/2020 
Netherlands (CPB) -4.2 2.8 2.2 1.2 1.3 1.5 4.1 6.1 5.4 11/2020 
Poland (Case) -3.5 4.1 4.0 3.4 2.3 2.7 3.8 5.3 4.4 29/12/2020 
United Kingdom 
(NIESR) 
-9.9 3.4 4.3 0.8 1.0 1.9 4.6 6.5 7.1 08/02/2021 
a working day adjusted                     
b France reports the private consumption deflator         
** not working day ad-
justed                     
Focus: Labour markets in the pandemic
In the euro area, Covid-19 resulted in a reversal 
of recent trends as unemployment had de-
creased substantially amid a sustained period of 
uninterrupted growth from the high levels 
reached in the course of the Great Recession and 
the successive European sovereign bond crisis. 
In several countries, including Germany, the 
Netherlands and the UK, unemployment had 
even declined to long-term lows. This section 
takes a closer look at labour market develop-
ments during the Covid-crisis and labour mar-
ket policy responses in the countries hosting the 
EUROFRAME institutes. The sharp drop in ac-
tivity in spring 2020 led to a significant rise in 
unemployment in the euro area, from 7.2 per 
cent in February to 8.7 per cent in July, albeit 
with wide differences across countries. In the 
countries hosting EUROFRAME institutes the 
increase in the unemployment rate (Eurostat 
definition) from pre-crisis levels to the peak 
registered in the course of 2020 ranged from 
only 0.4 per cent in Poland and Italy to almost 
2.5 per cent in Ireland. The increase in unem-
ployment was, however, generally small com-
pared to the size of the fall in output, and much 
smaller than in the United States, where the un-
employment rate skyrocketed from 3.5 per cent 
in February to almost 15 per cent in April. In 
Europe the impact of the Covid-crisis on the la-
bour market was generally mitigated by short-
time work or furlough schemes which where 
adapted to the crisis and heavily used where 
available. The number of workers on these kind 
of schemes in relation to the labour force was as 
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high as 20-30 per cent in spring in a number of 
countries, including France, Italy, Austria and 
the UK. The numbers on the schemes decreased 
substantially during the recovery phase in sum-
mer but started to rise again more recently re-
flecting renewed lock-down measures taking ef-
fect.   
The governments of the EUROFRAME insti-
tutes host countries implemented a range of pol-
icy measures to support their labour markets. 
The most important labour market policy 
measures implemented were furlough schemes 
with country-specific generosities (Table 4). 
The UK implemented a new scheme with an av-
erage (effective) replacement rate for workers 
of around 80 per cent in gross terms. The Neth-
erland’s government introduced a furlough 
scheme starting with a very high level of 90 per 
cent wage coverage, but it will be gradually re-
duced to 60 per cent. Germany, Italy, France, 
and Austria changed their pre-existing systems 
to cover additional workers, extend the period 
of eligibility, or increase the replacement rates, 
with their new systems consisting of an average 
(effective) replacement rate of between 60 and 
87 in Germany, 80 per cent in Italy, and 84 per 
cent in France, in net terms, respectively, and 
between 80 and 90 per cent in gross terms in 
Austria. Poland’s and Finland’s furlough 
schemes are somewhat less generous. Poland 
introduced a new system with a replacement 
rate of up to 50 per cent of the gross salary, but 
no more than 40 per cent of the average monthly 
salary from the previous quarter, whereas Fin-
land modified its pre-existing system slightly to 
cover additional workers and extend the period 
of eligibility, retaining the pre-crisis average 
(effective) replacement rate of between 43 and 
56 per cent in gross terms. The furlough 
schemes with their improved features are tem-
porary, with their end dates varying from March 
31 (Italy) to December 31 (France and Ger-
many) this year. Part of the extensions of Fin-








The Covid-19 pandemic hit the Austrian econ-
omy hard in 2020, with GDP expected to de-
cline by 7.3 per cent. The trough was observed 
in spring, where the first hard lockdown with re-
strictive measures by the government to contain 
the pandemic took place (March and April). 
Public and economic life was reduced to a min-
imum. After a recovery period over the summer 
months with low infection figures, the second 
lockdown came into force on 3 November 2020, 
in response to the resurgence of infection fig-
ures; it was tightened starting 17 November and 
applied until 6 December. During this period, 
catering was restricted to pick-up, hotels were 
closed (except for business travellers), body-re-
lated services were prohibited, open commerce 
was restricted to grocery shops, pharmacies, 
drugstores and post offices, and customer con-
tact was limited to non-body-related services. 
Restrictions on restaurants and hotels continued 
after 6 December, and the remaining regulations 
from the second lockdown were reinstated on 
26 December. The full or partial closures affect 
mainly the retail sector, accommodation and 
food services as well as cultural, entertainment 
and recreational activities. The hard lockdown 
was ended on 7 February 2021, when shops and 
body-related services were allowed to re-open, 
whereas restaurants and hotels remained closed. 
Labour market 
The crisis is heavily affecting the Austrian la-
bour market. In 2020 the number of persons in 
dependent active employment fell by 2.0 per 
cent and the unemployment rate (according to 
Eurostat definition) rose from 4.5 per cent in 
2019 to 5.0 per cent (average January to No-
vember 2020). According to the national defini-
tion the unemployment rate increased by 2.5 
percentage points to a record high of 9.9 per 
cent.  
The Austrian Covid-19 short-time working 
scheme, called "Corona Kurzarbeit", prevented 
even stronger negative effects. Under this type 
of scheme, last used during the financial market 
crisis in 2009, employees reduce their working 
time and are compensated for the main part of 
the reduction in working hours, while compa-
nies save part of their personnel costs.  The 
Covid-19 short-time working scheme was intro-
duced in three phases, with employees’ working 
hours reduced on average by 10 to 90 percent 
for a maximum of 6 months in each phase.  
In the weeks of the first lockdown, with strict 
measures taken by the government to contain 
the pandemic, a massive drop in employment 
was recorded. In March and April, the number 
of employed persons declined by around 5 per 
cent compared to the previous year (as it was 
last seen almost 70 years ago). Most sectors of 
the economy were affected, services in particu-
lar, but also the industrial and the construction 
industry. Some of the decline was cushioned by 
the Covid-19 short-time working scheme, used 
lively by the companies. Utilization peaked in 
the last week of May with over 1.3 million reg-
istered cases of short-time work. 
With the end of the first lockdown and the sub-
sequent recovery during the summer months, 
the situation in the labour market improved tem-
porarily. With the renewed increase in infection 
numbers in autumn and the subsequent reintro-
duction of the government's containment 
measures, employment declined again in No-
vember and December, albeit at a slower pace 
than in spring, as the industrial sector is now 
less affected. Since October unemployment in-
creased again, and the unemployment rate based 
on the Eurostat definition reached 5.2 per cent 
in November. Also, the number of employees 
registered for Covid-19 short-time work rose 
again by the end of the year. Winter tourism and 
the seasonal labour market are strongly affected 
by the restrictions on restaurants and hotels con-
tinued after 6 December. 
Outlook 
The economic outlook for 2021 depends on the 
further development of the pandemic. Unem-
ployment is expected to decline only at a slow 
pace and will remain above the pre-crisis level 
also in 2022.  
13 
Finland 
The Covid-19 pandemic led the Finnish govern-
ment to introduce a partial lockdown on the 17th 
of March. The lockdown was made more strin-
gent by the isolation of Uusimaa, the largest re-
gion in Finland, and shutting down restaurants, 
cafes and bars at the end of March. The lock-
down and restrictions were progressively sof-
tened from 14th May to 30th June. Amid rising 
infection levels, the government started to in-
crease restrictions again in October, and they 
were progressively raised during winter. How-
ever at least until now, Finland has avoided a 
second lockdown. 
Finland’s GDP fell by 3.9 per cent QoQ in the 
second quarter of 2020, but recovered strongly 
in the third quarter amid the easing epidemic. 
The GDP growth in the fourth was probably 
slightly positive with the recovery in the service 
sector stagnating but the industrial sector’s re-
covery accelerating. ETLA estimates that Fin-
land’s GDP fell by between 3.0 and 3.5 per cent 
on the whole of 2020. 
Labour market 
The unemployment rate in Finland was 6.7 per 
cent in 2019, and the employment rate 72.6 per 
cent in the same year. Thus, Finland’s labour 
market confronted the corona shock in a rather 
healthy state, at least when measured by Finnish 
historical standards. 
The labour market effects of the corona crisis 
were mitigated mainly due to the furlough 
scheme available already before the corona cri-
sis. Basically, the system is available to all em-
ployers. It is probably the most important shock 
absorber mechanism in the Finnish la-bour mar-
kets. Employers can reduce their use of labour 
input via furlough schemes, which may range 
from days to several months, as specified by the 
employer. These may include a 100 per cent re-
duction in working time for a certain time span, 
or just reduced hours, for instance employees 
can be told to continue working 80 per cent of 
the normal weekly working hours. The system 
is effectively paid by social security 
contributions of firms and workers, that is, fun-
damentally by government mandated taxes.  
The system was adjusted due to the corona cri-
sis with four important measures: the legal pro-
cess needed when using these policies was 
made less time-consuming and easier for em-
ployers, employee's own-risk period was short-
ened so that they could get their compensation 
payments with no delays, and general terms of 
the system were made somewhat more generous 
for workers, and, perhaps the most important 
addition, self-employed were made eligible to 
the compensation scheme as well. 
The labour market shock in the second quarter 
of 2020 was severe, but since that situation in 
the labour market has improved markedly. The 
number of furloughed people peaked in April, 
reaching 164 000 on a monthly average, but 
numbers have come down since that signifi-
cantly, with the latest number from November, 
when on average 58 000 people were still on 
furlough schemes. Less dramatically, the offi-
cial (trend) unemployment peaked in May, with 
an unemployment rate of 8.4 per cent. The latest 
available trend unemployment rate from No-
vember is 8.1 per cent (Chart 5). 
Outlook 
ETLA forecasts that Finland’s GDP will grow 
by 3.0 per cent in 2021. The growth is estimated 
to abate to around 2 per cent in 2022. The un-
employment rate is estimated to decrease to 7.9 
per cent this year and to 7.6 per cent in 2022. 
These numbers would mean that there is proba-
bly not significant scarring in the labour market, 
although there is still room for unemployment 
to decrease. In the end, the pace of the recovery 
is dependent on the progress of the mass vac-
cination programme since the service sector‘s 
recovery cannot be completed until the immun-
ity level in the population is close enough to 




Finland’s decent record (at least until now) of 
controlling the pandemic, helped by some rela-
tive advantages such as not being very densely 
lived country, cultural factors, and the structure 
of the economy in which the indus-trial sector 
still contributes 20 per cent to total output, have 
helped the country recover from the pandemic. 
Similarly, they partly explain the relatively 
good economic performance of Finland in 2020 
as compared to many other European countries. 
However, an aging population is expected to re-
strict the Finnish GDP growth in the medium 
run, and hence well-known challenges continue 
to lie ahead. 
France 
The Covid-9 pandemic resulted in the French 
government to introduce a stringent lockdown 
from 15 March to 11 May. The lockdown was 
progressively softened from 11 May to 15 June. 
A second but less stringent lockdown was intro-
duced in several steps from 17 October to 
30 October, including the closure of many ser-
vices. The lockdown was eased on 28 Novem-
ber and strengthened again from 15 December 
especially through curfew measures.  
French GDP fell by 5.9 per cent in the first quar-
ter and by 13.8 per cent in the second quarter; it 
rebounded by 18.7 per cent in the third quarter. 
The first official estimate suggests GDP fell by 
1.3 per cent in the fourth quarter. This led GDP 
to fall 8.3 per cent in 2020 and be 6.6 per cent 
below its trend level at the end of 2020. 
Labour market 
In 2019, French GDP grew by a mere 0.8 per 
cent (Q4oQ4). But job creation kept on growing 
(1.1 per cent, +335,000 jobs). This reflected a 
structural slowdown in labour productivity 
growth, the impact of the abolishment of social 
contributions on low wages, and the impact of 
labour law deregulation measures which in-
duced an increase in the number of precarious 
jobs.  At the end of 2019, the unemployment 
rate stood at 8.1 per cent (i.e. a fall by 0.7 per-
centage point in a year). The unemployment rate 
had been decreasing since mid-2015, when it 
had reached a peak of 10.5 per cent; it had not 
yet reached its end of 2007 rate (7.2 per cent). 
From end 2007 to end 2019, the marginal labour 
force (‘halo du chômage’) clearly increased 
(from 4.4 per cent to 7.7 per cent of the labour 
force). The share of permanent contracts de-
creased from 77.6 per cent to 74.8 per cent. 
Conversely, the participation rate increased by 
2.2 percentage points, although it fell by 1.1 
percentage point for people aged between 15 
and 24 years, by 2.3 percentage points for men 
aged between 25 and 49 years. The participation 
rate rose by 0.8 percentage point for women 
aged between 25 and 49 years and by 18.4 per-
centage points for people aged between 55 and 
64 years. All in all, the employment rate in-
creased by 1.4 percentage point (+2.2 per cent) 
despite a rise in the unemployment rate.  
From end-2007 to end-2019, the labour force (in 
FTE and including marginal labour force) in-
creased by 7 per cent: the number of jobs in-
creased by 5.4 per cent, the ‘broader’ unem-
ployment rate (in FTE including marginal la-
bour force and involuntary part-time work) rose 
from 14.1 per cent to 15.4 per cent. 
On 25 march 2020, in view of the magnitude of 
the Covid-19 crisis, the French government im-
proved the short-time working (or unemploy-
ment) scheme. Under this scheme employees 
Chart 5 – Labour market Finland 
 
Number of unemployed and workers on furlough schemes, 
respectively, in % of labour force 
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earn 70 per cent of their gross wages (84 per 
cent of their net wages, with a floor at the net 
SMIC level, 1231 euros per month); while the 
employer has nothing to pay (before 25 March, 
companies were allocated a refund of only 7.23 
euro per hour up to a ceiling of 4.5 SMIC 
(SMIC: minimum wage, currently at 1,554.58 
euros per month). From 1st June 2020, the 
scheme was made less generous, employers 
were now requested to cover 10 per cent of the 
gross wage, except in specific sectors (tourism, 
hotels, cafés, restaurant, culture, events). The 
short-time working scheme limited the rise in 
unemployment; 73 per cent of hours not worked 
were covered by this scheme (as compared to 7 
per cent for a reduction in overtime and holi-
days, 20 per cent through jobs cuts). The costs 
of this scheme are estimated at 28 billion euros 
in 2020 (in gross terms, but it should be noted 
that the scheme reduced costs which would 
have occurred otherwise in terms of higher un-
employment). The number of people in short-
time work/unemployment reached 8.4 million 
in April (i.e. 5.4 million in FTE), it decreased to 
1.2 million in August and rose again to 2.9 mil-
lion in November (Chart 6). 
Chart 6 – Labour market France 
 
Number of unemployed and workers on furlough schemes, 
respectively, in % of labour force 
Source: Eurostat, national sources, own calculations. 
 
Measures targeted at young people were intro-
duced through a scheme called ‘1young people 
1solution‘ (1jeune1solution): 4000 euros grant 
were provided to companies hiring a worker 
aged below 26, 5000 euros apprenticeship grant 
were provided (for people aged below 18) or 
8000 euros (for young workers above 18, and an 
increase in the young workers’ schemes (‘Gar-
antie jeunes’ and schemes designed to help 
young people to get their first job). However, it 
should be noted that young people initially 
mostly need jobs in line with their skills and 
qualifications. 
Lockdowns led to a rise in temporary unem-
ployment and ‘Halo’ of unemployment, which 
makes it difficult to assess unemployment, as 
many unemployed could not look for a job. 
According to Pôle Emploi (the French unem-
ployment agency) the number of workers in cat-
egory A (people without a job and looking for a 
job) increased by 10.5 per cent between Febru-
ary and November 2020, i.e. from 3.245 to 
3.586 million (+340,000). The number of unem-
ployed in categories ABC (part-time workers, 
looking for a job) increased by 6.1 per cent be-
tween February and November 2020, i.e. from 
5,385 to 5,714 million (+300,000). The unem-
ployment rate increased for younger people ra-
ther than older people and for men rather than 
women.  
Since early March 2020, 86,000 redundancies 
were made for economic reasons (i.e. 50,000 
more than in the same period of 2019). This 
amounts to a small part only of the rise in the 
number of unemployed.  
In the third quarter of 2020, the unemployment 
rate (ILO definition) stood at 9 per cent, i.e. 
+260,000 as compared to end 2019. The partic-
ipation rate fell by 0.2 percentage point, the un-
employment rate (relative to total population) 
increased by 0.6 percentage point; the employ-
ment rate fell by 0.9 percentage point (1.35 per 
cent). Employment fell more for young people 
(-2.7 per cent) than for older people (-0.6 per 
cent). Women were more affected than men by 
job losses, but female unemployment rose less 
than male unemployment, as more women left 

























































































In the fourth quarter of 2020, GDP remained 
around 6.6 per cent below its pre-Covid trend 
level. The number of employees jobs fell 
strongly in the first half of the year (-700,000), 
before rising in the third quarter (+400,000), 
and is expected to have fallen again in the fourth 
quarter (-400,000). In the fourth quarter of 
2020, as compared to the same quarter of 2019, 
the number of jobs would have fallen by 
800,000 (-3.4 per cent), the number of unem-
ployed (ILO definition) would have risen by 
360,000 (i.e. an unemployment rate of 9.5 per 
cent), i.e. a fall by 400,00 in the labour force, 
this being explained by discouraged people, ei-
ther for health reasons, in industries having been 
obliged to close (Hotels-cafés-restaurants, tour-
ism, leisure, culture), or as in normal times, by 
discouraged people.  
Outlook 
The outlook for 2021 relies heavily on Covid-
19 developments. In a very favourable scenario, 
French GDP would grow by 8 per cent in the 
fourth quarter of 2021 (Q4oQ4), +5.7 per cent 
on an annual average but output would remain 
3.6 per cent below its trend level at the end of 
2021.  
Under this scenario, the number of jobs would 
remain roughly stable in 2021, the progressive 
return to ‘normal’ activity in many sectors being 
offset by jobs adjusting to a lower output level 
in many sectors and the impact of companies’ 
difficulties (according to a OFCE study,6 com-
panies’ bankruptcies could lead to 180,000 jobs 
losses. Firms would remain overstaffed by 
around 1.2 per cent). Only half of discouraged 
unemployed would return to the labour market. 
With rising unemployment (by 400,000), the 
unemployment rate would reach 11 per cent, i.e. 
3 percentage points more than in the end 2019.  
Germany 
The German economy was heavily impacted by 
the economic repercussions of the Covid-19 
                                                          
6 Eric Heyer : « Défaillances d’entreprises et destructions 
d’emplois – Une estimation de la relation sur données macro-
sectorielles », Revue de l’OFCE 168, novembre 2020. 
pandemic, with a sharp contraction of GDP of 
9.8 per cent in the second quarter followed by a 
rebound in the summer months as activity nor-
malized in most parts of the economy (Q3: +8.5 
per cent). In autumn, the progressive rise of in-
fections led the authorities to re-introduce lock-
down measures, which were limited to a small 
part of the economy initially (hospitality and en-
tertainment mainly), but were extended to in-
clude large parts of the stationary retail sector 
and personal services before Christmas and in 
January 2021. The first official estimate put the 
decline of GDP in 2020 at 5.0 per cent. 
Labour market 
The German labour market had been in one of 
the longest upswings ever before the Covid cri-
sis hit. Since 2006, employment had increased 
by 15 per cent and the unemployment rate more 
than halved, from 12 to 5 per cent (national 
measure) and 11 to 3 per cent (Eurostat meas-
ure), with only a minor interruption in the 
course of the Great Recession. With the Covid 
crisis unfolding in spring 2020, registered em-
ployment increased sharply from 2.3 million to 
2.9 million persons, and the unemployment rate 
jumped to 6.4 per cent (national measure). The 
economic rebound during the summer led to a 
gradual decline to 2.8 million (6.1 per cent) by 
December 2020. So far, the re-introduction of 
lockdown measures in November and Decem-
ber have not yet had a visible impact on unem-
ployment. According to the Eurostat definition, 
the increase was more gradual, but has not yet 
peaked in contrast to the national measure. The 
number of short-time workers skyrocketed in 
spring 2020, reaching an all-time high of 6 mil-
lion people or 15 per cent of all employees 
(Chart 7), with an average share of furloughed 





work was reduced substantially during the sum-
mer, the number of short-time workers of 2 mil-
lion in October (latest figure) was still markedly 
higher than at the peak of the Great Recession. 
To be sure, the increase in unemployment does 
not fully reflect the number of jobs lost in the 
economy. Many workers left or did not enter the 
labour force, as they are eligible neither for un-
employment benefits nor for basic income sup-
port. In addition, net immigration – a significant 
source of additional employment in past years – 
decreased considerably in 2020. 
Policy responded to the crisis by extending the 
duration of the short-time working scheme 
(STW) from 12 to 24 months and relaxing the 
rules for firms to apply for the scheme. Other 
STW-related measures include full reimburse-
ment of STW-related social security contribu-
tions to firms and the increase of the STW al-
lowance from 60 per cent of lost net earnings 
for employees without children and 67 per cent 
for employees with children, respectively, to 
70/77 per cent from month 4 onwards and to 
80/87 per cent from month 7 onwards, provided 
the reduction of working hours is at least one 
half. All STW extensions are limited until the 
end of 2021. The maximum duration of contri-
bution-based unemployment benefits was ex-
tended by 3 months for those whose regular 
maximum duration was reached between May 
and December 2020. Tax-financed basic in-
come support was made more generous with 
less strict means test (concerning protected as-
sets) and increased reimbursement of accom-
modation and heating costs until March 2021. 
At the same time, active labour market policy 
measures (such as training measures) were re-
duced notably, mainly as a result of pandemic-
related contact restrictions.  
On the company level, the reduction of hours on 
working-time accounts and of overtime played 
only a minor role, according to our estimates. 
This is probably to a large extent due to the fact 
that the German economy was more or less at 
normal capacity utilization at the beginning of 
the crisis, with the manufacturing industry al-
ready in a downswing for two years. This con-
trasts sharply with the recession in 2008/2009, 
which hit the German economy in the middle of 
an economic boom with very high capacity uti-
lization. 
Outlook 
The partial shutdown since November and the 
tightening of measures around the turn of the 
year are expected to lead to a renewed increase 
in short-time work and a decline in employment 
in the coming months, although to a much 
smaller extent than in last spring. In a scenario 
of progressive and sustained normalization of 
economic activity starting in spring this year, 
short-time work should quickly decline in the 
remainder of the year, and the recovery in em-
ployment is also expected to gain momentum 
towards the end of 2021. On an annual average, 
the unemployment rate will nevertheless in-
crease again in 2021, albeit only slightly. 
Ireland 
The first lockdown in Ireland was put in place 
in March. This strict lockdown, in which many 
businesses were forced to shut, was extended to 
May. After this point there was a gradual easing 
of restrictions until September. However, due to 
an increase in cases at this time (the so called 
‘second wave’) strict administrative closures 
were again brought in in the middle of October. 
Chart 7 – Labour market Germany 
 
Number of unemployed and workers on furlough schemes, 
respectively, in % of labour force 

























































































Cases fell sharply over this period and re-
strictions were again eased at the start of De-
cember. However, case numbers again in-
creased rapidly through December and into Jan-
uary (third wave) and once again the strictest re-
strictions were brought in.  
Labour market 
The Irish labour market was performing very 
strongly before the crisis. The unemployment 
rate had been falling gradually since its peak af-
ter the GFC in 2012. The unemployment rate 
had fallen below 5 per cent which is around the 
rate considered to be full employment.  
Two main labour market policy responses were 
triggered by the Covid-19 crisis: The Pandemic 
Unemployment Payment (PUP) and the Tempo-
rary Wage Subsidy Scheme (TWSS) which was 
later replaced by the Employment Wage Sub-
sidy Scheme (EWSS).  
The PUP is welfare payment made to those who 
have lost their jobs because of Covid. i.e., be-
cause they were made unemployed due to the 
impact of the pandemic on their place of em-
ployment. It was initially a flat level of €350 but 
was later based on how much the employee was 
earning when they were employed. 
The wage subsidy schemes were payments 
made to the employer for keeping their employ-
ees on the payroll. 
The Central Statistics Office (CSO) releases 
two measures of unemployment, an upper bond 
and a lower bound. The upper bound includes 
all those on the PUP as being unemployed. As 
of December, the upper bound is 20.4 per cent 
while the lower bound is 7.2 per cent (Chart 8). 
The true rate of unemployment likely lies some-
where between these two measures. 
One of the potential reasons cited for the signif-
icant increase in cases in December has been the 
large Irish diaspora which returned home at 
Christmas. The open border with Northern Ire-
land means that the spread of the pandemic in 
the Republic of Ireland is influenced by Covid 
policy in that jurisdiction. 
 
Outlook 
As long as the pandemic is widespread the la-
bour market will struggle. Further lockdowns 
through 2021 will likely result in the unemploy-
ment rate remaining elevated. However, as the 
vaccination programmes are rolled out through 
the year, we would expect there to be a strong 
recovery in the labour market. As the adminis-
trative restrictions were lifted following the ini-
tial lockdown in March, the unemployment rate 
(wide definition) fell very sharply from over 30 
per cent in April to 15.9 per cent in September. 
This shows that the labour market can recovery 
strongly in a short period of time. However, un-
doubtably some businesses will cease trading 
altogether as a result of the pandemic and it will 
likely take an extended period of time before the 
labour market reaches full employment again. 
Italy 
The pandemic is imposing a very high price on 
Italy’s labour market, notwithstanding govern-
ment’s actions to deal with the impact of the 
containment measures on the economy and the 
disruption to non-essential economic activities.  
As the first European country to be hit by 
Covid-19, Italy entered lockdowns already at 
the end of February 2020, progressively 
Chart 8 – Labour market Ireland 
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extended till May. As a consequence, the drop 
in GDP in the second quarter amounted to -18.5 
per cent compared to pre-crisis levels (2019Q4). 
After a strong rebound during the summer 
(+15.9 per cent QoQ), the second wave of the 
pandemic is expected to have reduced economic 
activity again during the winter (-2 per cent 
QoQ for 2020Q4 according to the official flash 
estimate). 
Labour market 
Starting from March, the Italian government ap-
proved several interventions (Cura Italia “Save 
Italy”, Decreto Liquidità “Liquidity Decree”, 
Decreto Rilancio “Relaunch Decree”, Decreto 
Agosto “August Decree”, Decreti Ristoro “Re-
lief Decrees”), overall amounting to 108 billion 
euros, in order to respond to the Covid-19 out-
break and support the economy. A sizable 
amount, about 20 billion euros, has been allo-
cated to strengthen and broaden the tools for in-
come support, focusing on preventing an exces-
sive rise in unemployment and the preservation 
of jobs.  
In particular, the Cassa Integrazione Guadagni 
(CIG, the pre-existing furlough scheme that al-
lows workers to temporarily receive a benefit, 
generally equal to 80 per cent of their total sal-
ary, while still keeping their job) was extended 
to all categories of employees, regardless of 
firm size or sector of activity. Also, allowances 
for the self-employed and seasonal workers 
(two categories particularly hit by the crisis but 
that before did not have access to such benefits) 
were introduced. In addition, layoffs have been 
suspended. All these measures have been pro-
gressively extended in their duration and 
amount in order to cope with the second wave 
of the pandemic and are still in place. 
Looking at unemployment, these measures 
seem to have been very successful. In fact, the 
unemployment rate in 2020 was on average 9.1 
per cent (Chart 9), lower than the pre-crisis 
level (9.6 per cent in January). However, this is 
the result of a sharp increase in the number of 
inactive people during the lockdowns (+7 per 
cent) and of the fact that furloughed workers are 
still counted as employed. Actually, according 
to own calculations, in April and May 2020 the 
number of full-time equivalent (FTE) workers 
on this short-time work schemes was around 
6 million, equal to 26 per cent of the employees. 
Chart 9 – Labour market Italy 
 
Number of unemployed and workers on furlough schemes,  
respectively, in % of labour force 
Source: Eurostat, national sources, own calculations. 
 
So, to have a realistic picture of the labour mar-
ket during this pandemic we have to look at 
hours worked, that in our estimate dropped by 
12 per cent on average in 2020 (-21.6 per cent 
in the first half of the year), and at full-time-
equivalent employees, which fell by 5 million 
units. In addition, one should consider that ac-
cording to some studies, job creation was about 
60 per cent lower than the one registered in the 
previous year and that several temporary and 
seasonal contracts disappeared. This has re-
sulted in a very asymmetric labour market ef-
fect, as the crisis has hit young people, women, 
and low-skilled workers the hardest.  
Outlook 
To sum up, FTE employment is estimated to fall 
sharply in 2020 (-9 per cent), in line with GDP 
(-8.9 per cent), and not to return to pre-Covid 
levels in 2021. In headcount terms, the contrac-
tion is much smaller (-1.8 per cent) and this, 
coupled with the labour supply drop (-2.7 per 
cent), is mitigating the effect on unemployment 
(9.1 per cent in 2020 from 9.9 per cent in 2019). 
We expect the unemployment rate to peak in 

























































































inactive working-age people may re-enter the 
labour market and some workers will be laid off 
having been employed under the extraordinary 
short-time work scheme. 
The Netherlands 
After a relatively calm summer in 2020, Covid-
19 cases in the Netherlands began to rise again, 
peaking at the end of October and again just be-
fore Christmas, this time the peak was higher 
than October. New, stricter lockdown measures 
were taken and cases have started dropping 
again. In total, over 925.000 people (or 5,4 per 
cent of the population) has been tested for Covid 
and over 13.000 people (or 0.08 per cent) have 
died.7 
Schools and workplaces were closed from 16 
March to 9 May and again from 16th of Decem-
ber until (now) February 9th (2021). Public 
events were cancelled throughout the period 
(from 12 March onwards), with a brief relaxa-
tion in the summer (30 June to 28 September). 
Also, restrictions on gatherings were relaxed af-
ter the 30th of June, but were tightened after the 
18th of August and have remained in place since 
then. A curfew was imposed at the end of Janu-
ary 2021 until the beginning of March.8 
Labour market 
Employment growth continued combined with 
exceptionally low unemployment. In December 
and January of 2019, two record lows in unem-
ployment were recorded since 2003 at 3.2 per 
cent and 3.0 per cent respectively. The unem-
ployment rate was expected to average 3 per 
cent in 2020.9 
The furlough scheme in the Netherlands is 
called NOW, an acronym that stands for “Tem-
porary Emergency Bridging Measure for Em-
ployment”. The NOW 1.0 was intended to ac-
commodate employers facing loss of revenue 
due to the corona crisis. During the first appli-
cation period, employers could continue to pay 
                                                          
7 Source: OCHA, retrieved 18th January 2021 at 
https://data.humdata.org/dataset/novel-coronavirus-2019-ncov-
cases# 
8 Source: The Oxford Covid-19 Government Response Tracker 
(OxCGRT), retrieved 18th January 2021 at 
employees' wages in the event of (expected) 
loss of turnover of at least 20 per cent in a period 
of three months. The period of revenue loss had 
to start in March, April or May 2020. The first 
application period closed on June 6, 2020. The 
wage costs to compensate employer contribu-
tions were 30 per cent.  
NOW 2.0 is the second scheme for compensa-
tion for wage costs of employers who again ex-
pected a loss of turnover of at least 20 per cent 
in a connected period of four months. The in-
crease in wage costs to compensate employer 
contributions went up from30 to 40 per cent. 
The continuous period of loss of sales had to 
start in June, July or August 2020. If the com-
pany had received NOW in the first application 
period, the new period had to follow the previ-
ous period. The second application period 
closed on September 1, 2020.  
For self-employed people a scheme called Tozo 
(Temporary bridging scheme for self-employed 
persons) was established, which consists of a 
supplemental subsistence allowance and a 
working capital loan to cover liquidity problems 
due to the corona crisis. The scheme applied ret-
roactively from 1 March 2020 and expired at the 
end of May 2020. This scheme has been suc-
ceeded by Tozo 2.0' with a term until October 1.  
So far, the Netherlands has witnessed a substan-
tial decline in employment in persons, though 
the decline up to and including April (and May) 
was quite limited compared to other western 
countries and has even recovered somewhat in 
the last months of 2020. This is generally con-
sidered to be related to the special policy 
measures taken, including financial support for 
short-time work. 
In the third quarter of 2020, 419 thousand peo-
ple were unemployed, or 4.5 per cent of the la-
bour force (seasonally adjusted). Compared to 
the second quarter of 2020, the number of un-
employed has increased by 70 thousand. The 
https://www.bsg.ox.ac.uk/research/research-projects/corona-
virus-government-response-tracker 
9 Source: CPB, available at https://www.cpb.nl/centraal-econo-
misch-plan-cep-2020-mlt 
21 
increase in unemployment in the second quarter 
is related to the decrease in the number of peo-
ple in work in the first months of the corona cri-
sis. Unemployment rose in the third quarter 
mainly because more people started looking for 
work, rather than because many people lost their 
jobs. 
The total number of jobs for employees and 
self-employed persons came to 10 722 thousand 
in the third quarter of 2020. Compared to a year 
earlier, the number of jobs has fallen by 51 thou-
sand. This labour market development has a 
clear seasonal pattern. After correction, the total 
number of jobs in the third quarter was 165 
thousand higher than in the second quarter of 
2020. That represents an increase of 1.6 percent. 
Such an increase has never happened before. In 
the second quarter, the number of jobs fell by 
297 thousand. The number of jobs is now 
slightly above the level of the first quarter of 
2019. 
In general, there has been a large shift in hours 
worked at the workplace and hours worked 
from home. The drop in hours worked was most 
pronounced in sectors where there is a limited 
opportunity to work from home, like the cater-
ing sector, the culture and entertainment sector 
and the retail sector.  
In March-May, 139 thousand firms with a total 
2.7 million employees (36 per cent of all em-
ployees in the Netherlands) claimed short-time 
work subsidies from NOW1. In June-August 
this figure dropped to 63 thousand firms with a 
total of 1.3 million employees (18 per cent of all 
employees). As a result, the Dutch government 
has supported firms with an amount of 9.9 bil-
lion euro in March-May and 5.3 billion euro in 
June-August. Furthermore, it is estimated that 
around 374 thousand self-employed (25 per 
cent of all self-employed in the Netherlands) 
                                                          
10 Jongen, E., P Verstraten. 2020. Netherlands (November 2020). 
IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring. Available at: 
https://www.iza.org/wc/files/downloads/iza__crisismoni-
tor_countryreport_nl_202011.pdf 
11 Source: CPB, 2020. Available at: https://www.cpb.nl/sites/de-
fault/files/omnidownload/CPB-Raming-Actualisatie-MLT-2022-
2025-november-2020.pdf 
have claimed welfare from Tozo in March-May, 
which dropped to 103 thousand in June-August 
(7 per cent of all self-employed).10 
Outlook 
The short to midterm outlook is that unemploy-
ment will peak in 2021 and is expected to de-
cline to its equilibrium level in subsequent 
years. The decline from 6.1 per cent in 2021 to 
4.5 per cent in 2025 is due to the pick-up in em-
ployment growth. At 0.6 per cent a year, the 
growth of the labour force is lower than the 0.8 
per cent in the previous period. Aging is slow-
ing down the growth of the labour supply; the 
corona outbreak is slowing down labour migra-
tion.11 
The response of the government during this un-
precedented crisis has been unparalleled in 
terms of the speed and breadth of the interven-
tions and this may have led to relatively mild 
consequences for employment from an interna-
tional perspective. It is not unreasonable to as-
sume that there will be an acceleration in work-
ing from home and a more rapid adoption of 
technologies to collaborate and work online. 
Furthermore, online shops are likely to get a 
boost. For the long term, an optimistic view is 
that the Covid pandemic was a prototypical ex-
ternal shock, not due to an imbalance in the sys-
tem, which suggests that we may return to the 
growth path from before the Covid-19 pan-
demic eventually. 12 
The number of self-employed people is rela-
tively high in the Netherlands: in 2018, the per-
centage of employees with a flexible employ-
ment relationship was 22.5 per cent, self-em-
ployed persons 16.5 per cent, self-employed 
persons without employees (ZZP) 12.2 per cent 
and employees with an employment relation-
ship 61 per cent.13 
12 Source: Jongen, E., P Verstraten. 2020. Netherlands (Novem-
ber 2020). IZA COVID-19 Crisis Response Monitoring. Availa-
ble at: https://www.iza.org/wc/files/downloads/iza__crisismoni-
tor_countryreport_nl_202011.pdf 






In response to the Covid-19 pandemic and re-
strictions imposed on economic activity, GDP 
in Poland in the second quarter of 2020 went 
down by nearly 9 per cent quarter-over-quarter 
(QoQ). A 10.5 and 9.0 per cent QoQ decline in 
private consumption and fixed investment, re-
spectively, in the second quarter were the main 
contributors to the overall plunge of GDP in 
2020. In the third quarter of 2020, with the ease 
of containment restrictions, the Polish economy 
sharply rebounded and GDP soared by 7.9 per-
cent QoQ. The 13.5 per cent QoQ increase in 
private consumption was the main driver of the 
sharp increase of GDP in the third quarter. The 
surge in new infections and the reintroduction 
of containment measures are expected to bring 
a halt to the recovery of the economy in the last 
quarter of 2020. Overall, the GDP decline in 
2020 is expected to reach 3.5 per cent. As the 
Polish economy recorded a positive growth 
each year between 1991 and 2019 with an aver-
age annual growth rate equal to 4.2 per cent, the 
year 2020 will mark the worst performance of 
the economy in nearly three decades.  
Labour market 
As of March 2020, the Polish Parliament started 
adopting packages of legislative laws named as 
Anti-Crisis Shields, which up to January 2021 
has been amended five times. The main employ-
ment-related means to prevent lay-offs intro-
duced as the initial response to crisis were sub-
sidies for employee remuneration costs and so-
cial security contribution measures for compa-
nies experiencing sharp decline in their turno-
ver. In addition, furlough schemes of up to three 
months duration for a reduction of employee's 
working time by up to 20 per cent, but not more 
than to half time, were introduced. It is esti-
mated that overall 44 thousand companies made 
us of the means introduced as the initial re-
sponse to the crisis.  
The unemployment rate in Poland has been 
gradually decreasing since 2013 reaching 3.3 
per cent in 2019. Thanks to employment-related 
measures introduced by the government, the in-
crease in the unemployment rate in 2020 was 
not proportional to the decline in economic ac-
tivity. In November 2020, over 170 thousand 
companies utilized the employment-related 
measures with the statistics on the number of 
subsidised workplaces and furloughed persons 
unavailable. As a result, the number of em-
ployed went down by approximately 0.8 per 
cent leading to an increase in the unemployment 
rate from 3 per cent in January 2020 up to 3.8 
per cent in November 2020. At the same time 
the number of vacancies decreased by nearly 27 
per cent.  
Outlook 
The expected easing of the Covid-19 re-
strictions is expected to help the Polish econ-
omy recover at the pace of over 4 per cent in 
2021 and 2022. Despite the recovery, the phase-
out and time limitations to the labour market 
measures are expected to increase the unem-
ployment rate. In order to restrict the increase in 
unemployment levels, the government intro-
duced changes in employment conditions. Im-
portantly, employees as of 2021 are allowed to 
force employees to vacation leave and thus re-
duce accumulated overtime and the stock of va-
cation period throughout 2021. Despite these 
measures and expected recovery, the lay-off and 
reduced number of vacancies are forecasted to 
result in the unemployment rate reaching 5.3 per 
cent in 2021. 
United Kingdom 
On many measures the UK has had the worst 
Covid economic impact of all major economies, 
with GDP shrinking by 18.8 per cent in Q2 and 
forecast to shrink by around 10% in 2020 
compared with 2019. This includes a rise of 16 
per cent in Q3 as the government attempted to 
‘re-open’ the economy, including a subsidised 
restaurant and pub dining scheme. June and July 
were the strongest rebound months, with growth 
slowing to around 1 per cent per month in 
September and October. There is currently 
some discussion about the international 
comparability of the UK’s GDP figures owing 
to the different measurement of public sector 
output in the UK: health output is measured in 
terms of a normal set of services like operations 
23 
and doctor visits, so despite increased spending 
and the NHS operating at capacity it appears 
that health output fell by 30 per cent between 
February and April. 
However, even with any measure of adjusted 
statistics, the UK has still been very hard hit in 
economic terms as well as having one of the 
worst health outcomes in terms of deaths per 
head of population. The reasons for these are 
not yet entirely clear but it may be that the UK 
spends a relatively large proportion of national 
income on social consumption: the sectors 
which were disproportionately affected by the 
virus. Lockdowns vary between the nations of 
the UK but in England, the largest economy by 
some distance, the first and strictest lockdown 
in the spring was followed by a second, smaller 
one in November. The resurgence of the virus 
has led to a third beginning in January which is 
expected to have a larger economic impact than 
November’s but smaller than April’s. 
Labour market 
Before the pandemic the UK had low and stable 
unemployment of around 4 per cent. Since the 
financial crisis unemployment figures have 
repeatedly surprised in a positive way but this 
may have come at the expense of pay, 
investment and productivity, which all 
recovered very weakly post-GFC. 
Unemployment did not initially rise, but up to 
9.5m people (around a third of the workforce) 
were furloughed on the Coronavirus Job 
Retention Scheme (Chart 10). There was no 
furlough scheme in the UK before Covid. It was 
implemented relatively quickly and paid 80 per 
cent of normal earnings (with employers’ 
option to ‘top up’ partly or fully); initially the 
CJRS was only full-time but from July there 
was the option of part-time furlough too. 
 
Over the summer employer contributions were 
gradually increased from 0 per cent to 20 per 
cent but these were dropped when the resurgent 
virus caused the scheme to be extended to 
Spring 2021. This announcement was made 
within hours of the planned end of the scheme 
on 31 October, too late for many staff who had 
been given redundancy notices in anticipation 
of the end. Unemployment has gradually risen, 
from 3.8 per cent in May to 4.9 per cent in 
September, on the Eurostat measure. 
Alternative measures, including from tax 
authority data, suggest a larger decrease in the 
number on payrolls. 
The extension of furlough meant the shelving of 
its proposed successor, the Job Support Scheme 
designed to support short-time working. 
Initially at least this was less attractive than the 
CJRS, with a minimum of 33 per cent hours 
worked and paid, plus employer contributions 
of 33 per cent of the unworked hours. The JSS 
was subsequently amended so that minimum 
hours were 20 per cent and employer 
contributions 5 per cent of unworked hours. A 
separate JSS scheme for sectors forced by 
restrictions to close entirely (effectively a 
continuation of the full-time CJRS) was 
announced, under which the government would 
Chart 10 – Labour market UK 
 
Number of unemployed and workers on furlough schemes, 
respectively, in % of labour force 

























































































pay 67 per cent of earnings and employers could 
choose whether to top this up. The JSS schemes 
were never put in place as the original furlough 
scheme was extended at the end of October. 
These are the principal labour market 
interventions, though there have been support 
programmes for the self-employed and 
businesses as well.  
Outlook 
Unemployment is widely expected to rise when 
the CJRS does come to an end: currently 
scheduled for April, but subject to further 
extensions. Policy debate has been around 
whether and when to extend it, with some keen 
to end the CJRS sooner and switch to active 
labour market policies for job creation. More 
information is expected at the Budget on 3 
March. So far a small subsidy scheme for hiring 
young workers, and a lifetime entitlement to 
further study, have been announced. 
 
